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vABSTRACT
Murphy, Zachary R. MA, Purdue University, May 2015. Extended Scaffolding: A
More General Theory of Scaffolded Cognition. Major Professor: Daniel Kelly.
New and emerging technologies called neuroprostheses are challenging our
ideas about where one’s mind ends and the environment begins. Cochlear implants,
which completely replace the functioning of the inner ear, are now a common treat-
ment for deafness. Berger et al. (2012) developed a device that replaces long-term
memory in rats Berger et al. (2012), while Hampson et al. (2013) created a brain-
machine interface that converts a desire to move one’s arm into the motor neuron
impulses required to achieve that movement Hampson et al. (2013)—both offering
promising treatments for dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, and paralysis. Deep brain
stimulation is now a common way of regulating neural activity to manage muscle
tremors in patients with Parkinson’s disease. These devices completely replace parts
of human anatomy we would normally consider to be performing cognitive processing.
Are these devices themselves part of the cognitive system or do they just facilitate it?
Are they parts of our minds or just sophisticated tools? More philosophically, these
are metaphysical questions about where the boundary between the mind and the en-
vironment lies. Ultimately, this work establishes a principled way to set down such a
boundary by developing a methodology for modeling potentially cognitive processes
vi
using graph theory and applying graph-theoretical analytics to rigorously delineate
mind from environment.
11. INTRODUCTION
New and emerging technologies called neuroprostheses are challenging our ideas about
where one’s mind ends and the environment begins. Cochlear implants, which com-
pletely replace the functioning of the inner ear, are now a common treatment for deaf-
ness. Berger et al. developed a device that replaces long-term memory in rats (2012),
while Hampson et al. created a brain-machine interface that converts a desire to move
one’s arm into the motor neuron impulses required to achieve that movement(2013)—
both offering promising treatments for dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, and paralysis.
Deep brain stimulation is now a common way of regulating neural activity to man-
age muscle tremors in patients with Parkinson’s disease. These devices completely
replace parts of human anatomy we would normally consider to be performing cog-
nitive processing. Are these devices themselves part of the cognitive system or do
they just facilitate it? Are they parts of our minds or just sophisticated tools? More
philosophically, these are metaphysical questions about where the boundary between
the mind and the environment lies. Ultimately, this work establishes a principled way
to set down such a boundary.
I proceed in chapter 2 by first exploring the challenges these new technologies
pose to our ideas about the mind and discuss two solutions concerning where to set the
mind–environment boundary: those of Andy Clark and Kim Sterelny. Clark argues
2that cognition extends beyond the brain and skull to include anything, biological or
not, that complements the cognitive processes occurring inside the skull. On the other
hand, Sterelny argues that rather than saying extracranial processes are cognitive, we
should say instead that they are just ‘scaffoldings’ for cognition: clever ways in which
we organize our environment to ease processing demands on (intracranial) cognitive
processing. Each justifies his position by an appeal to explanatory power. Clark
thinks that nothing but his position gives adequate importance to the environment in
accounting for cognition, while Sterelny argues that his theory not only gives adequate
importance to the environment but accounts for more of the environment than Clark’s
theory.
In chapter 3, I put forward a new way of setting down a mind–environment
boundary utilizing elements of Sterelny’s scaffolding model. Sterelny himself does
not take establishing a robust mind–environment boundary to be a primary goal. So
while Sterelny makes some claims about the boundary of cognition, he does not offer
a robust account of where this boundary lies. That said, Sterelny seems to limit cog-
nition at the skull. I begin this chapter by showing how the scaffolding model itself
is independent of Sterelny’s claims about where the boundary is. I then put forward
a more general scaffolding model—one that focuses not on agent–process scaffolding,
but scaffolding as a relation holding between two processes. With this conception
of scaffolding, we can model scaffolding using graph theory. Using graph-theoretical
analytics, we can identify some core set of processes as the mind and all other pro-
cesses as the environment. I take this use of graph theoretical modeling and analytics,
3together with a few assumptions to make the model align with current cognitive sci-
entific understanding, to be a rigorous method of setting down the mind–environment
boundary. Finally, this chapter finishes by showing how Extended Scaffolded Mind
Thesis (ESM) is distinct from, and has explanatory advantages over, both of Clark’s
and Sterelny’s models.
Chapter 4 includes a series of case studies, showing how ESM can be applied in
several cases, including both human and non-human examples. In particular, I show
how ESM can be applied to past, modern, and future humans. In doing so, I show
how ESM adds to the explanatory power and rigor of the evolutionary theory of past,
present, and future hominid cognitive development. Moreover, I demonstrate how
ESM can be used to set mind–environment boundaries in radically non-human minds
by applying ESM to IBM’s Watson supercomputer. In doing so, I further illustrate
the explanatory power and scope of ESM.
Finally, chapter 5 concludes. Ultimately, ESM is a principle by which to set
down a mind–boundary distinction in a way that has more explanatory power than
either Clark’s or Sterelny’s positions.
42. WHERE IS MY MIND?
2.1 Neuroprosthetics and Metaphysics
In recent years, new and developing technologies, such as cognitive prosthetics,
have been challenging our ideas about where the mind ends and the environment or
tools begin.
Cochlear implants can effectively replace the biological cochlea (Zeng, 2004).
A healthy cochlea is lined with approximately 3,000 hair cells that are tuned to
different frequencies. Different sounds resonate in different hairs, allowing the cochlea
to register different sounds and convert them to neural impulses. Nerves from each of
the hair cells coalesce into the auditory nerve, transmitting the encoded sound to the
brain (most immediately to the temporal lobe). Cochlear implant candidates have
deafness resulting from having significantly fewer hair cells, diminishing the neural
impulse sent along the auditory nerve. In a cochlear implant, a microphone picks
up sound waves, which are then digitized by a speech processor. This digital signal
is then transmitted via radio waves across the skull to the implant, which sends the
signal through an electrode fused to the auditory nerve (see fig. 2.1). In this way, a
cochlear implant completely replaces the function of the cochlea, namely, converting
sound waves into processed neural impulses.
5Fig. 2.1. Cochlear implant. Reproduced from Zeng (2004, p. 7).
6Damage to the hippocampus can result in anterograde amnesia (the ability to
form long-term memories), and is a common finding in patients with dementia and
Alzheimer’s disease (Berger et al., 2012, p. 198). Berger et al. developed a device
that restored the ability to form long-term memories (2012). They found that neu-
ral activity recorded in the CA3 subfield of the hippocampus is highly predictive of
memory responses in rabbits. They then disabled hippocampal output using MK801
(Dizocilpine), which left activity in CA3 unaffected but prevented the animal from
forming long-term memories. They then re-introduced the electrical signal recorded
from CA3 to the output neurons in CA1, resulting in the restoration of long-term
memory formation abilities (Berger et al., 2012, p. 204-5). See fig. 2.2. A com-
panion study showed that the same device applied to animals with intact long-term
memory formation abilities results in increased performance, above normal biological
capacities (Hampson et al., 2010). Hampson et al. applied this prosthesis to rhesus
monkeys with the same methodology and found similar results (2013). This device
effectively replaces or augments the CA1/CA3 subfields of the hippocampus, and has
the potential to restore memory capacities to patients with dementia and Alzheimer’s
disease.
Deep brain stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus is now a common technique
for regulating neural activity and managing tremors in patients with Parkinson’s
disease (Zibetti et al., 2011). An electrode is inserted into the subthalamic nucleus,
the origin of muscle tremors in some patients with Parkinson’s disease, and then
connected to a (usually) subclavian pulse generator (Zibetti et al., 2011, p. 2328).
7Fig. 2.2. Berger et al. device. Reproduced from Berger et al. (2012, p. 200).
8The electrical impulses effectively negate the activity of the subthalamic nucleus,
eliminating muscle tremors.
Andersen et al. have developed a model for a human-implantable device that
takes over processing in the premotor cortex, which processes the desire to move into
specific motor neuron impulses, and which has the potential to effectively cure some
kinds of paralysis and create fully integrated limb prostheses. Most current neural
limb prostheses are guided by motor signals, such as eye or facial muscle movement
(Andersen et al., 2010, p. 171). While effective to a degree, these prostheses lag
far behind natural limb movement. Faster, more integrated prostheses require direct
access to neural activity further up the causal chain. Purposeful motor impulses are
issued from the M1 motor cortex. However, such neuronal activity is largely devoid
of goal information, since it consists of motor neuron commands. That said, the
premotor cortex, particularly the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and the parietal
reach region (PRR), are highly predictive of goal-directed movement. The concept
device developed by Andersen et al. registers this goal-directed activity in the pre-
motor cortex and processes this activity into motor commands that can then be fed
to efferent motor neurons or artificial limb prostheses (see fig. 2.3). Ultimately, the
device replaces the functioning of the motor cortex.
Are these devices literally parts of our minds, or are they just tools our minds
use to support their activities? This is ultimately a metaphysical question: what is the
extension of the mind? Where is the boundary between mind and environment? One
way to solve this question is to let our metaphysical commitments on the boundary of
9Fig. 2.3. Andersen et al. concept device. Reproduced from Andersen
et al. (2004, p. 490).
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the mind be led by what gives us the most explanatory power. That is, if saying that
a neuroprosthesis is part of the mind yields greater explanatory power than saying it
merely facilitates cognition, then we should consider the neuroprosthesis to be part
of the mind. Similarly, if saying that a neuroprosthesis is merely an aid to cognition
rather than a part of cognition itself yields greater explanatory power, then we should
not call the neuroprosthesis itself cognition. Ultimately, this work presents a way to
draw the boundary between mind and environment along this line of thought. Before
stating this answer, though, we must explore previous answers from which it is built.
2.2 EM and SM
At least two camps of thought have emerged on how to set down the mind–
environment boundary so as to maximize explanatory power. Andy Clark’s Extended
Mind Thesis claims that the mind can, and does, extend beyond the brain. On the
other hand, Kim Sterelny’s Scaffolded Mind Thesis says that cognition stays bounded
by the skull, and the things EM points to as cognition are really just clever ways of
facilitating cognition. The remainder of this chapter first looks at each of these theses
in detail, then recounts the exchange of blows over which one has greater explanatory
power.
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2.2.1 Extended Mind Thesis (EM)
The Extended Mind Thesis claims that cognitive processes can be instantiated
outside of the skull. There have been at least two prominent formulations of EM: the
parity and complementariness formulations, which I explain below.
Parity formulation
The Parity Formulation of EM (EMP) was initially proposed by Andy Clark
and David Chalmers in “The extended mind” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), and was one
of the first theses to get EM off the ground. To motivate their claim, they consider
the cases of Inga and Otto. Suppose Inga wants to go to the Museum of Modern
Art (MOMA). She consults her memory for a second, recalls the location of the
museum, and takes off (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 12). Presumably, the mechanism
realizing Inga’s memory is some set of neurons. In this case, we seem to have no
trouble saying that these neurons are, in some relevant sense, part of her mind and
performing cognitive processes; her belief that the MOMA was at such and such a
place seems contained in these memory neurons.
Now consider Otto, who cannot retain long-term memories due to having
Alzheimer’s disease. To compensate for this deficit, Otto carries around a notebook
in which he writes down things he wants to remember later (Clark & Chalmers,
1998, p. 12). Let’s assume written in his notebook is the location of the MOMA.
Suppose Otto wants to go to the MOMA. He consults his notebook quickly, recalls
12
the location of the museum, and takes off (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 12). Clark
and Chalmers point out that Otto’s notebook serves the same role as Inga’s memory
neurons: containing the information of where the MOMA is (Clark & Chalmers,
1998, p. 15). Moreover, given how tightly Otto is integrated with his notebook,
the only possibly relevant difference between Otto and Inga is that Otto’s memories
are stored in a notebook while Inga’s memories are stored in the brain. However,
such a difference seems superficial: we should, Clark and Chalmers claim, say that
Otto’s notebook is just as much a part of his mind as Inga’s memory neurons are—
we should say Otto’s notebook is, in a literal and robust way, part of his mind
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 13). Generalizing, they say that we should not be
brain chauvinists: “there is nothing sacred about skull and skin” (Clark & Chalmers,
1998, p. 14). To say that Inga’s memory neurons are part of her mind while Otto’s
notebook is not makes an arbitrary, and hence unnecessary and unjustified, boundary
of cognition at the skull.
More formally, they state what has become known as the Parity Principle (PP):
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process
which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing
as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of the
cognitive process. (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8)
That is, anything outside the skull which functions just like something within the
skull should be considered to be literally part of the mind. Here we can clearly see
the Functionalist underpinnings of EMP (Clark, 2008a, p. 46).
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Several problems have been raised against EMP, of which I’ll mention just
one of the most pressing. PP only allows for cognitive mirroring: the only sorts of
mental processes that can exist beyond the skull are those that are already inside the
skull. Strictly adhering to PP, any difference in functioning between intracranial and
extracranial processes is enough to say that the extracranial process is not cognitive.
The only kinds of cognitive processes that are possible are those that are already
instantiated intracranially. If there is no intracranial functional equivalent of an
extracranial process, then the extracranial process is automatically disqualified from
being cognitive (Sutton, 2010, p. 196). However, this seems contrary to the line of
argument Clark wants to pursue, since he wants to move away from a commitment to
the priority of intracranial processes. So, EMP seems ill-suited to serve as a general
EM principle of what processes should be included as part of the mind.
Complementariness formulation
The Complementariness Formulation of EM (EMC) arose as a response to
problems with EMP, and has been championed (for my purposes) by John Sutton
(Kirchhoff, 2012, p. 290). Sutton presents his ‘Complementarity Principle:’
In extended cognitive systems, external states and processes need not
mimic or replicate the formats, dynamics, or functions of inner states and
processes. Rather, different components of the overall (enduring or tem-
porary) system can play quite different roles and have different properties
14
while coupling in collective and complementary contributions to flexible
thinking and acting. (Sutton, 2010, p. 194)
This is to say that so long as a process is integrated into the cognitive system in
the right way—whether it resembles some mental process internal to the skull or
not—it should be considered a cognitive process. This line of thought focuses on
saying that what is important in deciding whether or not some process is part of
some cognitive system is not whether the process resembles anything that is already
going on within that system, but instead focuses on whether or not that process is in
the right functional relationship to the cognitive system.
So, for example, to know whether or not Otto’s notebook is literally part
of his mind, we shouldn’t look for some isomorphism between the notebook and
some undisputedly cognitive process within Otto’s skull. Instead, we should look at
how the notebook interacts with Otto’s intracranial cognitive processes. It is highly
coupled with Otto’s intracranial cognitive system, he has access to it at any time,
and he is highly dependent on it. These factors are quintessentially complementary to
the intracranial cognitive processes, and so—according to EMC—we should consider
Otto’s notebook to be part of his mind.
We can view EMC as a refinement and subsuming of EMP (Sutton, 2010, p.
206) As Sutton et al. say, “Complementarity best captures the spirit of extended cog-
nition...The human brain is a leaky associative engine (Clark 1993), shaped in both
evolution and development so as actively to integrate and coopt external resources
such as media, objects, and other people” (2010, 525-6). Any process that meets the
15
PP conditions to be considered a cognitive process is, de facto, a process that com-
plements intracranial cognitive processing and so also satisfies the conditions of EMC.
Moreover, EMC is explicitly not committed to the cognitive mirroring requirement of
EMP, since what is important is the functional integration of an extracranial process
rather than what function the process itself is performing.
Recently Clark has advocated a view closer to EMC than EMP, and has even
claimed that EMC was his intended thesis all along (Clark, 2008b, 114; Clark, 2010,
52). He says that PP was meant, from the beginning, as a “‘veil of ignorance’ style
test meant to help avoid biochauvinistic prejudice” (Clark, 2008b, p. 77). This seems
plausible, given the presentation of several ‘coupling criteria’ in Clark & Chalmers
(1998), such as portability and reliability, which suggest a more nuanced theory than
the EMP formulation of EM.
Given these considerations, the target formulation of EM I will use for the
rest of this work will be EMC, and I use EM and EMC interchangeably unless stated
otherwise.
2.2.2 Scaffolded Mind Thesis (SM)
The Scaffolded Mind Thesis thesis, put forward by Kim Sterelny, claims that
cognitive processes are not instantiated outside of the skull, and the extracranial
processes that EM points to are nothing more than clever ways of organizing one’s
environment to facilitate and ease real cognitive processing (occurring solely within
the skull). In “Minds: extended or scaffolded?” (2010) Sterelny makes this response
16
to EM—in particular to EMP-type theses, although much of what he says carries over
to EMC-type theses. He sets out to argue that
the canonical extended mind cases are continuous with other cases, cases
in which there is environmental support of cognition, but which are not
plausibly treated as constituents of agents’ minds. Moreover, the depen-
dence of cognitive competence on extra-somatic resources turns out to be a
special case of a more general phenomenon [namely scaffolding]. (Sterelny,
2010, p. 466)
Scaffolded digestion
Thinking about cognitive extension is messy. To ease into an explanation of
cognitive scaffolding, Sterelny takes a helpful detour into digestive scaffolding first,
and I will follow him on this explanatory path. Consider human digestion and how
it has changed over time. Digestion requires the breakdown of foodstuffs into com-
ponents to be absorbed into the bloodstream. We have processes internal to the
body that perform this function: teeth begin a brute, manual breakdown of food into
smaller pieces. Saliva contains amylase, which starts to break down starches. Stomach
acid is perhaps the most vivid process of the chemical breakdown of foodstuffs. The
small intestine has a specialized lining that allows foodstuffs to enter the bloodstream,
and the colon recovers fluids from the digestive matter. Every mechanism in this pro-
cess is evolutionarily optimized: the size and shape of teeth, chemical constitution of
saliva, size of stomach, strength of stomach acid, and the length of the intestines are
17
all optimized for the type of foodstuffs that enter the body. Thus, humans and cows
have different digestive mechanisms due to differences in what goes in the mouth.
Herbivores, carnivores, and omnivores all have different types of hardware, each type
optimized to what goes in the mouth.
However, there is something that further sets humans apart from herbivores
and carnivores, and even other omnivores: humans cook their food. We prepare food
in a wide range of ways: cutting, pounding, soaking, grinding, fermenting, baking,
boiling, roasting, pickling, and so on (Sterelny, 2010, p. 467). Well-prepared food is
certainly a hedonistic pleasure, but there is more to be said for its importance. By
preparing food, humans have changed the norm of what enters their mouths: instead
of eating raw foods, most foods humans eat are prepared in some way. What is impor-
tant here is that these ways of preparing food are ways of breaking down the foodstuffs
to be more readily digestible—preparing food performs processes of the digestive sys-
tem. Cutting performs the processes done by chewing; baking, roasting, and boiling
perform the processes done by digestive juices; and so on. So, processes that the
human digestive system would otherwise have to perform are instead offloaded into
the environment via things like fire, ovens, knives, boiling water, etc.
Moreover, as we have evolved this offloading of digestive processing onto the
environment has changed the human body. Since we cut our food into small chunks,
we don’t need massive, powerful teeth. Further, massive and powerful teeth become
an evolutionary burden: developing such teeth takes resources that could have been
expended elsewhere. Similarly, our “under-powered jaws, short gut, small teeth and
18
mouth” are the result of our gustatory niche—one that depends on food preparation
(Sterelny, 2010, p. 468). Our reliance on food processing can be readily seen in the
difficulties raw foodists have in maintaining healthy levels of food intake and nutrient
absorption (Sterelny, 2010, p. 467). So, in offloading digestive processing into the
environment, we have become dependent on these extrasomatic processes.
One thing we could say about our food preparation is that since it performs
the same processes as body-based digestion, food preparation is digestion. This
would make cooking a case of ‘extended digestion.’ Sterelny points out, however,
that he knows of no one who is prepared to make such a statement (Sterelny, 2010,
p. 468). Instead, Sterelny says that “[o]ur digestive system is environmentally scaf-
folded” (Sterelny, 2010, p. 468, emphasis in original). To say that food preparation
is scaffolding for digestion and is not digestion itself is to say that food preparation is
a clever way in which humans have organized and affected their environment in such
a way as to ease processing demands on the actual digestive system itself.
Scaffolded cognition
Sterelny’s claim concerning extended cognition is that the cases that EM points
to are to the mind as food preparation is to digestion. They are cases of offloading
processing into the environment, but merely as scaffolds for cognition and not as parts
of the cognitive system themselves. As he says, “The scaffolded mind hypothesis pro-
poses that human cognitive capacities both depend on and have been transformed by
19
environmental resources” (Sterelny, 2010, p. 472). So, SM says that the environment
is fundamentally important for cognition, but not in the way EM holds.
Here Sterelny tells the story he has been advocating in the decade leading
up to “Minds: extended or scaffolded,” which shows how “intergenerational social
learning profoundly shapes our minds and lives” (Sterelny, 2010, p. 470). This story
is fleshed out in his 2003 book Thought in a Hostile World, in which he adopts
the niche construction model developed by Kevin Laland, John Odling-Smee, and
Marcus Feldman. A fundamental concept of evolutionary theory is that animals
adapt to their environments and form niches, i.e. particular ways of interacting
with the environment in order to meet biological needs. As an organism’s niche
changes, the organism adapts to those changes. Agents of niche change might include
climate change, for example, or the introduction or elimination of another species from
an environment. However, some organisms engage in ‘niche construction,’ wherein
they themselves act as agents of change for their own niches. Typical products of
niche construction are burrows, nests, and webs, which all “modify the impact of the
environment on their builders” (Sterelny, 2003, p. 147). So, for organisms that engage
in niche construction, there is a two-way adaptive process between the organism and
its environment. The organism adapts to its niche, but then changes its niche in some
way. It then adapts to this new niche, changes that niche again, adapts to this new
niche, and so on.
Sterelny’s claim is that humans engage in cognitive niche construction: “hu-
man cognitive capacities both depend on and have been transformed by environmental
20
resources” (Sterelny, 2010, p. 472). Over evolutionary time, humans have developed
ways to organize their environment in ways that offload some cognitive processing
from intracranial architecture onto environmental entities. He calls these environ-
mental supports ‘cognitive scaffolding.’ For example, long-term memory is certainly
an important component of human life. However, its biological hardware (neurons)
is metabolically expensive. To have the benefits of long-term memory yet not expend
metabolic resources on biological hardware, we store information in the environment
that is readily accessible when the need for it arises. One way we do this is through
writing. Writing stores information in the environment for access later, but does not
take up expensive neural resources. Moreover, through writing a single individual
can ‘recall’ more information than he/she could ever learn and memorize. So, not
only does writing ease cognitive processing demands, but it also facilitates access to
more information than the human mind can store at once. So, notes, books, etc. are
cognitive scaffoldings since they are important for and support cognition, but are not
themselves cognitive processes. In this way, humans have engaged in cognitive niche
construction through the development of cognitive scaffoldings.
Sterelny suggests that there are at least three dimensions of cognitive scaf-
folding: trust, individualization, and entrenchment. Each of these is a graded func-
tional relationship between the agent—i.e. mind—and some part of the environment
(Sterelny, 2010, p. 473). That is, being trusted, individualized, entrenched, etc., is a
matter of degree rather than being a bivalent property.
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Trust Sterelny defines the trust dimension of scaffolding as “the agent’s assessment
of the reliability of their access to a resource and the reliability of the resource itself”
(Sterelny, 2010, p. 474).1 That is to say, the more an agent believes that a cognitive
resource2 is always at hand and contains reliable information or processing, the more
that resource functions as a scaffold for the mind. For example, Otto puts a high
credence in the assumptions that (1) his notebook will always be there when he needs
it, and (2) the information in his notebook is reliable. So, Otto’s notebook falls fairly
high on the trust dimension. On the other hand, my notebook is not always with
me, and I think it is not unreasonable to think someone could take it and modify the
information in it. So, my notebook has less trust than Otto’s, and is in that sense
less of a scaffolding. As this makes apparent, trust is on a gradient: resources can be
more or less trusted, and this correlates with their being more or less scaffolded.
Individualization A cognitive resource is individualized when it is utilized by one
cognitive system, i.e. one person. Often resources are customized to work for a single
person. Sterelny talks about professional chef’s knives which are custom-molded to
their hands (Sterelny, 2010, p. 475). Such knives only work for the person they were
designed for; nobody else can pick them up and work with them fluently. Similarly,
Otto’s notebook is of use only to him. While the notes jotted down may be meaningful
for him, it may not be useful for just anyone who comes along and flips through
1It seems like there might really be two dimensions here: 1) trust in reliable access to the resource
and 2) trust in reliable information contained in the resource. We could very well treat these as
two different dimensions—Sterelny is not committed to these exact dimensions or the number of
dimensions.
2Terminological point: I use ‘cognitive resource’ to pick out a process that is not itself cognitive
but is nonetheless important for cognition.
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the notebook. On the other hand, anyone could pick up my smartphone, find the
calendar, and gain the same information about my schedule that I get when I look
at it. So, other people would have no trouble using my calendar, and thus it is less
individualized than Otto’s notebook. Again we can see that individualization is on a
continuum.3
Entrenchment A cognitive resource is entrenched when a cognitive system is highly
attuned to it, and were it replaced with a similar but not exact duplicate the cognitive
system would have trouble (or at least more difficulty) in using it. As Sterelny says,
again using the example of professional chefs,
Modification will often be mutual. The cook’s physical routines and skills
adjust to the weight, balance and sharpness of her knives; the cook’s move-
ments are adapted to her knife, just as the knife has been individualized to
her prior preferences. If forced to use different knives, an expert will cope,
but physical routines will be less comfortable and precise.” (Sterelny,
2010, p. 475)
The more an agent is attuned to a specific resource where another, albeit similar
resource simply will not do, that resource is entrenched. Again, entrenchment is on
a gradient, depending on how well the agent could cope with a different but similar
3Sterelny is not clear on why he thinks this is an important dimensions, but something akin to
it runs through Clark’s works as well. So, arguing that individualization is not important would tell
just as much against Clark as Sterelny. Moreover, Sterelny is not committed to any specific set of
scaffolding dimensions and the inclusion of individualization among them. In Sterelny (2004), he
may even be going the other way, saying “Clark underplays the importance of non-exclusive use of
epistemic artefacts. Many of our most important cognitive tools are common-use tools, not parts of
coupled systems” (Sterelny, 2004, p. 245).
23
resource. So, suppose we give Otto a different notebook with all the same information
in it, but organized in a different order. Presumably, he would have more difficulty
using such a notebook than if he had his own. He would likely ask for his original
notebook back. So, Otto’s notebook has a good degree of entrenchment.
As we can see, Otto and Otto-type cases fit easily into Sterelny’s scaffolding
space. So, Sterelny says that Otto-type cases exist at the maximal point of the 3D
scaffolding space (Sterelny, 2010, p. 480). By placing Otto-type cases here, Sterelny
makes it clear how such cases are merely a special case of a more general phenomenon;
they rank high on all three of the scaffolding dimensions, but this is all that separates
them from cases that lie elsewhere in the scaffolding space.
Sterelny is careful to say that there are at least these three dimensions to
scaffolding—there could be more. To have a neat way of talking about a process
being more or less scaffolded along this multitude of possible dimensions, I use ‘level
of integration’ as a catch-all term for the degree to which a device or process functions
as a scaffold for a cognitive system, or the degree to which some external resource
has been integrated into the workings of the mind, independently of what the specific
dimensions of scaffolding may be. So, a ‘highly integrated’ process is one which ranks
high on the dimensions of scaffolding, whatever they happen to be in a fully fleshed
out description of what constitutes cognitive scaffolding.
Sterelny uses this scaffolding model in service of accounting for hominid cog-
nitive development. Here I show an example of how Sterelny applies SM in service of
his explanatory goals. Although it is not Sterelny’s direct goal, I will ultimately show
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how my theory adds an interesting layer of explanation to Sterelny’s explanation by
tracing the expansion of the boundary of cognition throughout each of the cognitive
histories Sterelny offers.
In a chapter entitled “Heterogeneous Environments and Variable Response”
Sterelny (2003), Sterelny sets out to offer an explanation of human developmental
plasticity: the exceptionally high degree to which differences in environment dur-
ing the developmental stage of hominids (presumably the time up to and including
adolescence) can impact cognitive functioning. That is, human cognition is widely
variable depending on what environment the individual is raised in, to a degree un-
paralleled by any other organism, and this anomalous property of hominids needs to
be explained.
He pushes back against Cosmides and Tooby’s claims that we have cognitive
architectures adapted specifically to the Pleistocene, and instead argues that devel-
opmental plasticity is itself an adaptation to environmental instability:
[T]here is good reason to believe that cognitive and neural developmental
plasticity is adaptive; that human life-history considerations indicate that
we have evolved to extend our developmental period; that there is pale-
obiological evidence that hominids experienced increasing climactic and
ecological instability. We do not just happen to be part of a highly plastic
lineage; our developmental plasticity is an adaptation. (Sterelny, 2003,
pp. 170-171)
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That is, in response to increasing environmental variability in the Pleistocene era,
hominids developed a lengthened developmental period in which to adapt to any
environment in which the individual was born. Instead of adapting to Pleistocene
conditions in particular (as Cosmides and Tooby argue), hominids instead developed
ways to adapt to a wide array of environments, whether Pleistocene or modern. He
points to three dimensions of this plasticity: automated skills, affect, and neural plas-
ticity (Sterelny, 2003, p. 163). Automated skills are developed during childhood,
which then become permanent in adulthood. Similarly, aversions and disgust re-
sponses (affects) are acquired in childhood and are generally maintained throughout
adulthood. Moreover, human brains are themselves plastic in that neuronal patterns
are formed during adolescence and generally remain until death. As Sterelny notes,
although we know that human brains are plastic, the degree to which humans brains
are plastic is still an “open empirical question” and there is much more research
to be done (Sterelny, 2003, p. 164). Nonetheless, hominid brains are malleable to
some significant degree through adolescence, and this malleability allows hominids to
take on skills, affects, and other behavioral and physiological responses that persist
throughout the individual’s lifetime.
Importantly, for Sterelny, this developmental plasticity is molded not only by
the environment in which an individual happens to be born, but also by the products
of cumulative downstream niche construction:
Human brains are developmentally plastic, so transforming hominid de-
velopmental environments transformed hominid brains themselves. As
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hominids remade their own world, they indirectly remade themselves.
(Sterelny, 2003, p. 173)
That is, hominids began to take advantage of the exaggerated developmental plastic-
ity to modify hominid cognitive functioning through intergenerational learning. For
humans, the neural patterns set during one individual’s period of developmental plas-
ticity do not just stay with the individual. These patterns are subsequently passed
down to later generations during their developmental periods through intergenera-
tional learning. This constitutes a special form of niche construction, where members
of one generation actively influence the cognitive architecture of the next generation.
In this way, hominids have ha a direct impact on the development of their own minds
and have effectively “remade themselves” (Sterelny, 2003, p. 173).
2.2.3 EM vs SM
Clark (2008b) and Sterelny (2010) contain an exchange between Clark and
Sterelny over which of EM and SM has more ‘heuristic value.’ Sterelny appears to be
the first to bring in this terminology of ‘heuristic value,’ although he does not make
clear what he intends by it (neither does Clark, for that matter). As I will show, I
think we can interpret Clark and Sterelny as being in agreement about the fact that
what is at issue is whether EM or SM has more explanatory power. So, I take them
to each be positing reasons why their respective theory has more explanatory power
than the other, in virtue of where it draws the mind–environment boundary.
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Clark’s Arguments
In Clark (2008b), Clark argues that the EM framework is more compelling
than any of the other several theories that have been put forward recently, including
Sterelny’s SM. The basis of his arguments is that no theory other than EM gives
adequate importance to the environment (Sterelny, 2010, p. 479). He states:
What [EM] allows us to see clearly is that where ongoing human cognitive
activity is concerned, there are usually many boundaries in play, many
different kinds of capacity and resource in action, and a complex and
somewhat anarchic flux of recruitment, retrieval, and processing defined
across these shifting, heterogeneous, multifaceted wholes. To identify the
bounds of cognition with the bounds of the brain/CNS, or even with
those of the biological organism [as in SM], is to elevate just one or two
of these many boundaries and interfaces to permanent cognitive glory at
the expense of all the rest. (Clark, 2008b, p. 138, emphasis in original).
Here Clark makes the claim that anything that limits cognition at the skull discounts
the importance of extracranial resources for cognition. Although it is not language
he explicitly uses often, I think it is reasonable to say that he is making a claim
about explanatory power: he sees extracranial resources as having a fundamentally
important role in cognition, and all theories except EM fail to explain this importance.
In particular, he argues that Sterelny’s SM fails to adequately account for
the important role extracranial processes play for human cognition. In response
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to Sterelny’s account of downstream niche construction through intergenerational
teaching, Clark states:
Sterelny’s emphasis is thus very much upon the direct neural consequences
of the culturally and artifactually scaffolded training regimes applied to
young human minds. But although such consequences are surely of the
utmost importance, they do not yet exhaust the cognition-transforming
effects of material artifacts and culture. For many of the new cognitive
regimes supported by our best bouts of incremental epistemic engineering
seem to resist full internalization. It is no use, as Ed Hutchins (personal
communication) points out, trying to imagine a slide rule when you need
to work out a log or cosine! (Clark, 2008b, p. 68)
The idea here, I gather, is that accounting for how extracranial resources are devel-
oped, passed down, and refined still does not account for why we are dependent on
the material artifact itself to perform a task. That is, according to Clark, Sterelny
has given us a story about how slide rules developed and how a knowledge of slide
rules is passed down from one generation to the next and improved upon, but not a
story about why we cannot perform some mathematical calculations without having
a slide rule literally in hand. However, according to Clark, EM is perfectly capable of
explaining this: not having a slide rule is just like having part of your brain missing—
the hardware carrying out the processing is not present. So, EM better explains the
importance of extracranial cognitive resources than SM.
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Sterelny’s Arguments
In Sterelny (2010), Sterelny takes up Clark’s argument and claims to show
that SM need not underplay the importance of the environment; he thinks that scaf-
folding does give adequate importance to extracranial processes. SM is committed
to the claim that cognitive scaffoldings, although not themselves cognitive processes,
are necessary for certain cognitive processes to occur. Moreover, when an organ-
ism constructs a niche, it becomes functionally dependent upon those environmental
modifications.
For example, SM can account for why we cannot calculate logs and cosines
without a material slide rule. SM holds that slide rules developed as a way to store
a wealth of unit conversion information in the environment when storing all of this
information in on-board long-term memory or performing the complex calculations
in the head are both expensive. So, the reason we cannot perform log or cosine
calculations without a material slide rule present is essentially the same answer given
by EM: the information is in the slide rule, and the slide rule isn’t here at the
moment. The difference between SM and EM in this case is that whereas EM claims
that the slide rule constitutes a cognitive process (in particular long-term memory),
SM claims that the slide rule is just an aid to cognition. According to SM, calculating
a log or cosine with a slide rule is not, strictly speaking, performing a calculation—it
is a perceptual problem wherein one looks at the information contained on the slide
rule and accepts that piece of information as correct. In this way, Sterelny argues
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that SM does not understate the importance of slide rules to calculating a log or
cosine, and in particular it does explain our dependence on actual, material slide
rules.4 Clark is right to say that to explain how slide rules developed is not exactly to
explain why people depend upon them. However, to explain how individuals develop
in environments containing slide rules is is to explain eactly why people depend upon
them. So, Sterelny defeats Clark’s claim that only EM can give adequate importance
to the environment.
Sterelny then turns to arguing that SM has explanatory power EM lacks.
He begins by saying that while there is nothing obviously wrong with calling the
maximal point of the scaffolding space—occupied by Otto-type cases—literally part
of the mind, “[i]t obscures the fact that extended mind cases are special cases of
a general phenomenon” (Sterelny, 2010, p. 480). His argument here seems to be
that if we were to priviledge this maximal point of the scaffolding space (as EM
does), this discounts the importance of the rest of the range of cognitive scaffolding.
Focusing on just maximal cases leads us to think of less integrated cognitive resources
as less important. But, as Sterelny has shown, these less-than-maximal scaffoldings
are nevertheless sometimes vitally important, and often serve as the early forms of
what eventually develop or evolve into highly integrated scaffoldings.
4Similar arguments can be made for calculators as a way of calculating logs and cosines. One
difference, though, is that whereas a slide rule simply stores information, a calculator actually
performs symbol manipulations, which can then be read as calculations. So, while slide rules offload
long-term memory processing into the environment, calculators offload calculation (i.e. some form
of abstract symbol processing) into the environment. Beyond this, though, the cases are parallel:
calculators reduce calculation to a perceptual problem just like slide rules (Sterelny, 2007).
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Moreover, not only does EM’s privileging of Otto-type cases distract from
the importance of less-than-maximal scaffoldings (‘partial integrations’), but EM has
nothing to say about such cases. EM does not have the resources—short of adopting
a scaffolding framework—to talk about anything less integrated than Otto cases as
anything other than relatively uninteresting parts of the environment. That is, EM
accounts for things like Otto’s notebook by saying that they are parts of the cognitive
system. This works when the resource under consideration is at the maximal scaf-
folding point. However, EM does not seem to have anything to say about something
not maximally scaffolded, like my notebook. My notebook is certainly important for
my cognition: it stores information so that I can access it later and without it I would
be missing out on important pieces of information, but it is not integrated with my
mind to the extent that Otto’s notebook is integrated with his.
EM faces a dilemma here: it must either claim that my notebook is part of my
mind, or claim that it is not part of my mind. If EM says that my notebook is part of
my mind, the same reasoning can be used to say that an oven is part of the modern
human’s digestive system. If we take this claim to be metaphorical and mean only
that ovens have an impact on the modern human’s digestive system, then this is not so
radical of a claim. Clark, however, intends these claims to be taken literally: if Clark
is to be consistent, he must say that ovens are literally part of the human digestive
system. However, to Sterelny and to me this seems obviously wrong (Sterelny, 2010,
p. 468) One implication of this view that draws out why I find Clark’s position here
untenable is that it seems obviously wrong that gastrointestinal physicians, who are
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required to be well-educated on every aspect of human digestion, should be required
to also understand oven function, construction, and maintenance in order to practice
their specialty. On the other hand, if EM says that my notebook is not part of my
mind, then it does not have any resources to explain why it is nonetheless important
for my thinking. So, EM either leads to an abuse of the term ‘cognitive’ or fails to
explain large classes of phenomena.
Sterelny, however, uses the entire scaffolding space and the claim that there
is a continuum between my notebook and Otto’s to explain this. My notebook is
important for my cognition because I have stored information in it so that I do not
have to spend expensive neural resources on remembering that information yet can
still have access to it later. The only difference between my notebook and Otto’s
notebook is that his is more trusted, individualized, and entrenched—the difference
is merely a matter of degree. So, according to Sterelny, SM is more “heuristically
compelling” than EM since it has an account of the importance of less-than-maximal
scaffoldings, which EM doesn’t (Sterelny, 2010, p. 480).
Sterelny uses the terminology of ‘heuristic advantage.’ However, he does not
elaborate on what he means by this and what sort of value he sees here. That said,
I think it is reasonable to interpret him as making claims about explanatory power:
he has shown that SM can explain and account for phenomena that EM can’t.
Furthermore, Sterelny thinks that the EM picture cannot answer what he takes
to be the interesting and important questions:
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Are these the only dimensions of importance? To what extent are they
independent? What are the dynamics of movement in the space? Under
what circumstances, for example, do collectively used resources become
segmented into single-user resources and vice versa? How do resources be-
come individualized and entrenched? How to actual levels of trust covary
with trustworthiness? (Sterelny, 2010, p. 480)
EM has trouble answering these questions, since it does not have the tools to talk
about partial integrations. On the other hand, SM is a better model for these ques-
tions since it “focuses on the space itself” (Sterelny, 2010, p. 480). So, SM has more
explanatory power than EM since it has answers to questions that EM doesn’t.
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3. EXTENDED SCAFFOLDED MIND THESIS
I think that SM is a useful model for setting down the mind–environment boundary,
and my solution uses it as a foundation. However, I see Sterelny’s notion of scaffolding
as a special case of a more general notion of scaffolding. Using this more general
notion of scaffolding, we can formulate a robust and principled way of setting down
the mind–environment boundary. The first half of this chapter is an explanation of
this more general notion of scaffolding and how we can go about using it to setting
down mind–environment boundaries rigorously. The second half of this chapter shows
how this theory is both distinct, and has explanatory benefits over, both SM and EM.
3.1 ESM
My goal is to use the scaffolding framework to set down a rigorous and princi-
pled mind–environment boundary through what I call the Extended Scaffolded Mind
Thesis (ESM). Before starting on a statement of ESM, however, it is important to be
clear on the work ESM is doing and, equally importantly, the work it is not doing. I
am interested in setting down the mind–environment boundary, but not necessarily
identifying minds in the first place. To that end, ESM does not tell us what beings
are minded and which ones are not, but instead—given some being that we grant
has a mind—it tells us where the boundaries of that being’s mind are. So, instead of
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attempting to give necessary and sufficient conditions for a being to be minded, ESM
begins with the assumption that an entity is minded and delineates that mind from
its environment.
Sterelny uses the scaffolding framework as a relation between the agent and
the environment. Throughout his work, Sterelny makes use of a distinction between
agents and scaffolds. Presumably, his use of ‘agent’ maps onto this work’s use of
‘mind.’ Every process outside of the agent is somewhere on the scaffolding space,
ranging from minimal to maximal importance to the agent on whatever dimensions
of scaffolding there happen to be. So, Sterelny’s agent–scaffold distinction maps
onto the mind–environment boundary used in this work. In this way, scaffolding for
Sterelny is a relationship that takes the form ‘process p scaffolds agent a.’ What
makes a process scaffolding for the agent is that the agent depends on that process
or at the very least that process makes the agent’s own processing easier. This is a
relationship of degree, and there are multiple dimensions along which it varies, such
as trust/reliability, individualization, and entrenchment. Call this ‘agent–process’
scaffolding.
However, there is a more general (and ultimately more useful) notion of scaf-
folding we can employ, which focuses on scaffolding as a relationship between two
processes, rather than between an agent and a process. Ultimately, I’ll show that we
can use this notion to build back up to understanding scaffolding at the level of agent
and process, but in a more principled and robust way than Sterelny offers. Scaffold-
ing, for ESM, is the relationship holding between two processes p1 and p2 such that
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when p1 scaffolds p2, p1 eases p2’s processing demands. Call this ‘process–process
scaffolding.’ Process–process scaffolding is still a matter of degree, and there are
multiple dimensions along which it varies. Many of these align with the dimensions
Sterelny sets out, and it preserves the same flexibility regarding which dimensions
are salient. We can say that p1 is trusted/reliable for p2 when p2 generally does not
verify input from p1 against other inputs, and p1 is generally available whenever p2
needs its input. We can say that p1 is entrenched for p2 when p2 cannot operate
effectively without p1. Individualization is tougher to see, but we can still define it
as a sort of meta-scaffolding dimension. Say that p1 is individualized for p2 when p1
ranks highly on other scaffolding dimensions for p2 and only p2. In this way, we can
define dimensions of scaffolding in terms of a process–process relationship rather than
an agent–process relationship.
A feature of process–process scaffolding is that it can be modeled on (and is
perhaps easier to grasp through) graph theory. A graph is composed of nodes and
(possibly multiple) connections between them. In this case, the nodes would represent
processes and the connections (called ‘edges’) represent dimensions of scaffolding.1
Moreover, the connections can be directed: we can say that a relation is one-way and
nonsymmetrical, as the scaffolding relationship is. We can say that p1 scaffolds p2,
but p2 does not scaffold p1. Even further, we can give different connections different
weights or strengths. Obviously numerical weights would be arbitrary for scaffolding,
but they can still be meaningful in relation to each other. A relevant question,
1Although not concerned so much with scaffolding as the flow of information, modern functional
neuroanatomy operates on much the same model.
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though, is whether the range of scaffolding weights is bounded on either end: is
there a minimal or maximal level of scaffolding? My inclination is to say that there
are no such boundary points: there is no maximal or minimal level of scaffolding,
but the model I develop works equally well whether we say such limits exist or not.
Furthermore, this process network is transitive, with the transitive weight being no
greater than the weakest scaffold: if p1 scaffolds p2 with weight wa and p2 scaffolds
p3 with weight wb, then p1 scaffolds p3 with weight min(w1, w2). All together, we
can model the world as a multidimensional, directed, weighted network of processes,
related to each other through scaffolding relationships along each of the scaffolding
dimensions. Call this graph of all processes and their multi-dimensional scaffolding
relationships the ‘process network.’
Measuring scaffolding weight between two processes would take the form of
empirical testing regarding the strength of the quality associated with each dimension
of scaffolding. For instance, measuring the weight of entrenchment between two
processes amounts to empirical observations about how well the scaffolded process
operates when input from the scaffolding process is expected but unavailable. This is
a rough picture of what such measurements would look like and the empirical work
that would have to be performed, but the purpose of this work is merely to present
the ideas of ESM in general and leave a robust account of the empirical methodology
to further works.
Since we can model process–process scaffolding in this way, we can also apply
the analytic tools of graph theory to further characterize the graph and subgraphs, and
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through such tools we can set down the mind–environment boundary. So far, through
process–process scaffolding we have a large network of processes related to each other
by scaffolding relationships. This in itself does not delineate which processes are
cognitive and which are not. However, this process–process scaffolding model serves
as a good foundation for setting a principled mind–environment boundary. My goal
in this work is not to formulate the explicit analytics to be used, but to give an
account of what such analytics should look like and how they can be used to set
down a mind–environment boundary.
Setting down the mind–environment boundary for an individual amounts to
identifying some set of processes (a subgraph of the process network) as the mind.
Call this the ‘mind set.’ All processes outside of such a set are, then, the environment.
The hard part is identifying such a set. An important advantage of ESM is that it
aligns itself with cognitive science, so it is subject to reasonable assumptions that
undergird cognitive science. So, we can begin with a reasonable restriction on what
the mind set should look like. Namely, the mind set should be continuous: there
should not be ‘holes’ filled with non-cognitive processes in the cognitive network.
That is, if p1 scaffolds p2 and p2 scaffolds p3 where p1 and p3 are members of the
mind set, then p2 is also part of the mind set. One of these assumptions on which
cognitive science seems to operate is that the mind is continuous. So, to align ESM
with cognitive science, I say that the mind set should be continuous.
In principle, we could choose any continuous set to be the mind set for a given
minded being, since, as Sterelny says, the demarcation of mind from environment is
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arbitrary (Sterelny, 2010, p. 480). However, some sets align better with the concept of
mind at play in cognitive science. That is, even though in principle we could call any
continuous set the mind set, some of these possible sets mesh with the explanatory
goals of cognitive science better than others. I claim that to best mesh with cognitive
science and thus maximize explanatory power, the mind set should be identified with
a highly dense subgraph of the process network, where density is understood as the
ratio of cumulative edge weight versus the number of nodes considered.
To see why this maximizes explanatory power, consider what the process net-
work looks like. Presumably, areas around where we would normally approximate
minds to be (such as brains) have a high density of scaffolding: there are many
relatively highly trusted, integrated, and entrenched processes interacting with each
other, and this in general appears to not be true of many other parts of the pro-
cess network. Instead of thinking that there is anything inherently special about the
brain, however, I claim that it is this density of scaffolding itself that is salient—we
tend to approximate minds around highly densely scaffolded subgraphs of the pro-
cess network. This even seems to be part of Sterelny’s reasoning for why neuronal
memory should be considered part of the the mind while filofaxes should not be. He
argued that neuronal memory is much more reliable/trusted than filofaxes and for
this reason should be considered to be literally part of the mind, whereas filofaxes
are significantly less reliable/trusted and so should not be considered. However, the
argument that he makes here and the intuitions behind it are exactly the ones that
ESM works on, but in such a way that rigorously sets down the mind–environment
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boundary. Neuronal memory should be considered to be literally part of the mind
because it is part of the highly dense subgraph of the process network, and filofaxes
should not be considered to be literally parts of the mind because they are not in a
highly scaffolded relationship to processes in the highly dense subgraph of the pro-
cess network. Thus, in this sense, ESM can sensibly say that neuronal memory is
part of the mind while filofaxes are not because the former are highly reliable/trusted
(among other dimensions) while the latter are significantly less reliable/trusted. So,
ESM accounts for even Sterelny’s impression of the salient facts about identifying the
mind when his own theory falters. In this way, ESM is able to demarcate the mind
in such a way that meshes well with the explanatory goals of cognitive science.
So, density is the salient factor in identifying the mind set, but this does not
in itself say how this dense subgraph should be identified. Wherever we delineate the
mind set from the environment there are going to be scaffolding relationships crossing
this boundary. So, there is no clean division to be made between the highly dense
subgraph and the surrounding processes. However, this does not mean that we can’t
set down such a boundary in a reasonable place. We could use any number of graph
theoretical analytics to identify the highly dense subgraph to within some reasonable
tolerance. I don’t intend to show such analytics here, in part because it would distract
from the theoretical points at issue and would require real data to be meaningful, but
I take the fact that such mathematically rigorous tools can be applied to identify the
mind set to be a major advantage of ESM.
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In the place of these rigorous analytics, I offer a rough method for delineating
the mind set from the environment that still allows the virtues of ESM to show. The
question of whether or not a process is part of the highly dense subgraph becomes less
of a question the further one moves to the interior of the dense area. That is, there are
processes that are so obviously highly scaffolded that we can take them to be prima
facie part of the mind set. Portions of the human brain, such as the cortex (which
performs processing) and the thalamus (which in many ways functions as a networking
hub), are obviously very highly scaffolded, to a degree that few would seriously dispute
saying that these processes are part of the highly dense subgraph that is the mind
set—these processes are clearly about as scaffolded as the dense subgroup will get.
The question of whether or not a process should be considered to be part of the mind
set is more salient for processes that are less obviously part of the dense subgraph,
but are still more densely scaffolded than the rest of the process network. The rough
method I propose is that a process should be included in the mind set if the scaffolding
it contributes is not significantly different from the average2 of the mind set being
considered before its inclusion. That is, finding the mind–environment boundary on
this rough analytic is a recursive process. Beginning with the obviously dense subset,
each process that is being considered for inclusion in the mind set is compared to the
set of processes already admitted to the mind set. To preserve the continuity of the
mind set, candidate processes for inclusion at any give step of this recursive process
are those that are immediately adjacent to the set of processes already admitted to
2I am being purposely imprecise about the kind of average needed, since this will be filled in by
the chosen rigorous analytic.
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the mind set (i.e. they directly scaffold one or more processes already taken to be part
of the mind set). If the scaffolding weight this process contributes is significantly less
than the degree of scaffolding weight typical in this set of processes already admitted
to the mind set, then it should not be included in the mind set. On the other hand, if
the weight this process contributes is comparable to the degree of scaffolding typical
in this set of processes already admitted to the mind set, then it should be included
in the mind set. This is made to exclude processes that make a large step down in
terms of scaffolding weight. Processes that yield a small change in scaffolded weight
are permissible, but large jumps are prime points to draw the boundary. This rough
tool could be supplanted with a rigorous analytic without much difficulty, but this
rough tool allows us to see, at least in principle, how ESM works.
For example, consider the weight of scaffolding that my notebook (as opposed
to Otto’s) contributes to the obviously dense subgraph composed of parts of my
brain. The weight of the scaffolding between my notebook and my working memory
is significantly weaker than the average scaffolding weight present in this already
dense subgraph—for example, compare it to the weight of scaffolding between my
neuronal memory and my working memory. Including my notebook in the mind set
constitutes adding a significantly weaker scaffold to a set already composed of highly
densely scaffolded processes. So, according to ESM my notebook is not part of my
mind because there is too significant of a difference in scaffolding weight between
what my notebook contributes and the obviously-parts-of-the-mind-set.
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What about Otto’s notebook? Even in Otto’s case, there seems to be a large
step down in terms of scaffolding weight between the obviously densely scaffolded sub-
graph constituted by some of his intracranial processes and his notebook: as Sterelny
argues (although not in these terms), it is significantly less reliable/trustworthy than
many intracranial densely scaffolded processes. So, we should not consider it to be
part of his mind. However, given that Otto has Alzheimer’s disease, it may be the
case that the average scaffolding weight of his cortex and thalamus, while still greater
than the rest of the process network, is lower than people without Alzheimer’s dis-
ease. This means that Otto’s notebook may contribute a less significantly different
scaffolding weight than if he did not have Alzheimer’s. If this is the case, then ac-
cording to ESM we should be more apt to say that Otto’s notebook is part of his
mind since he has Alzheimer’s desease than if he did not, since the difference between
the scaffolding weight of his notebook and his neural processes is less than if he did
not have Alzheimer’s disease. And as Sterelny’s concerns emphasize, this is the case
even if ultimately we still say Otto’s notebook is not part of his mind.
The greater the falloff in scaffolding, the easier it is to draw a boundary be-
tween the mind set and the environment. That said, ESM has a more difficult time in
delineating mind from environment when there is nothing greater than a gradual re-
duction in scaffolding across a large area of the process network. If there are no large
step downs in scaffolding weight, there is no breaking point using the rough method
I introduced above. While this is a problem for this rough method, a mathematically
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rigorous analytic will be able to set down this boundary in just the same way it sets
down the boundary for minds with high scaffolding falloff.
At the beginning of this section I stated that ESM and process–process scaf-
folding would be able to explain everything we can explain in terms of agent–process
scaffolding, and now I turn to making good on that claim. We can treat a subgraph
as a process unto itself and talk about the processes that scaffold that subgraph.
That is, once we’ve distinguished the mind set from the environment, the agent can
just be identified with the mind set and we ask about the processes that scaffold it.
While processes may scaffold only a small number of processes within the mind set,
we can say that these scaffolding processes scaffold the mind set itself. So, through
process–process scaffolding, ESM can talk about agent–process scaffolding in just the
same way that Sterelny does by understanding the agent to be the mind set subgraph.
To summarize this section, ESM modifies the scaffolding framework Sterelny
sets out. Instead of seeing scaffolding as a relationship between agent and scaffold,
ESM sees scaffolding as a relationship between processes. On this view, we can imple-
ment graph theory to model all processes on a multidimensional, directed, weighted,
transitive graph, called the process network. The feature of this process network that
appears associated with minds is scaffolding density. So, setting down the mind–
environment boundary amounts to identifying some highly densely scaffolded set of
process as the mind and everything else is the environment. Using graph-theoretical
analytics along with a few reasonable constraints that ensure ESM identifies the
mind as something on par with the goals of cognitive science, we can make this pro-
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cess mathematically rigorous. I take this rigor to be a major advantage of ESM. In
the place of such rigorous analytics, which would require much space and real-world
data, I offer a rough method for separating the dense subgraph that is the mind set
from the rest of the process network. There is some core set of processes that have
an obviously highly dense scaffolding weight, to the point that we need not question
whether they are in the mind set or not. Other processes should be included in the
mind set if the scaffolding weight they would contribute to the mind set does not differ
greatly from the average scaffolding density within the mind set before the process
under consideration is added. This prevents processes that are significantly less scaf-
folded than the mind set from being part of the mind. In this way, ESM sets down
the mind–environment boundary in a principled and rigorous way that maximizes
explanatory power insofar as it meshes well with cognitive science.
3.2 How ESM relates to EM and SM
Now understanding ESM, we should see how it relates to EM and SM. In
particular, I show that not only is ESM distinct from both EM and EM, but it has
explanatory benefits over each.
3.2.1 ESM vs. EM
Insofar as ESM appeals to scaffolding density, it may appear similar to Clark’s
coupling criteria and complementariness of EM. However, while they may appear
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similar, this is not the case. EM used the concept of complementariness to delineate
mind from environment. This was to say that so long as a process is integrated with
the mind in the right way, it should be considered to be part of the mind. The ‘right
way’ here amounted to the process complementing intracrainal cognitive processes
in a highly integrated way. Clark calls this coupling. It may appear that ESM’s
talk of scaffolding density is just the same as EM’s use of the coupling criterion.
While the two are on some level similar, there are important explanatory differences.
EM does not have a substantial explanation for what it is that makes a process
tightly coupled with the mind, whereas ESM does. Moreover, EM does not offer an
explanation of how and why such coupling is the salient factor in delineating mind
from environment, whereas ESM does. Clark says that processes must be coupled
with intracranial processes to count as cognitive, but he does not offer as robust of
reasoning as ESM for why coupling is a salient factor in deciding whether or not a
process is cognitive. Even further, ESM has all of the explanatory advantages that
SM has over EM: EM does not have a good account of how non-cognitive processes
can be fundamentally important for cognition, whereas SM and ESM do. For these
reasons, ESM is not only distinct from, but is also explanatorially superior to, EM.
3.2.2 ESM vs. SM
Insofar as ESM uses a scaffolding framework and claims all of SM’s advantages
over EM, it may appear that there is no substantial difference between ESM and SM.
However, while they may appear similar, this is not the case. Since ESM uses the
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process–process scaffolding model, it has a much more articulated understanding of
the agent–scaffold relationship than SM. A consequence of this is that ESM has a
principled and rigorous way of setting down the mind–environment boundary, whereas
Sterelny’s SM does not. For these reasons, ESM is not only distinct from, but is also
explanatorially superior to, SM.
Moreover, there are interesting questions we can ask using ESM that we can’t
ask using SM. For instance, with ESM we can address questions about the intercon-
nectivity between cognitive processes: How are they organized? Are there patterns
to their structure? Are there separate systems within the mind that only interact at
pivotal points, or is there a great degree of connectedness between each process? For
humans, these are questions that must be answered by neuroscience. However, while
ESM has a framework with which to ask these questions, SM has no resources to
address such questions. So, here is another instance where ESM better meshes with
cognitive science than SM.
Therefore, not only is ESM distinct from both EM and SM, but ESM has
explanatory benefits over EM while also adding explanatory value to SM.
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4. CASE STUDIES: APPLYING ESM
Having seen the formal statement of ESM, it will be useful to see it in practice in
several different cases. Through doing so, the explanatory power of ESM will become
apparent. In this section, I apply ESM to a variety of different kinds of putative
minds, both human and radically nonhuman.
4.1 Human Minds
I begin in familiar territory, showing how ESM sets the mind–environment
boundary at the skull for modern day humans. I then show how ESM allows this
boundary to shift over evolutionary time by exploring how the mind–environment
boundary got to be at the skull for modern day humans and the possibility of it
expanding beyond the skull in the future.
4.1.1 Modern-day Humans
Above we saw how and why ESM says neuronal memory is part of a modern
human’s mind while notebooks are not. In doing so, we set down a small part of the
mind–environment boundary. This section looks at whether there are strong enough
similarities among modern humans to claim a mind–environment boundary in general.
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So far, we have looked at ESM in the context of a single mind. Multiple minds exist
on the same process network as separate highly densely scaffolded subgraphs with a
valley of relatively low-scaffolding processes between them. ESM draws the mind–
environment boundary for each of these minds independently, but we can look at
the resulting mind sets and see if there are any generalizations we can garner. In
doing so, we are looking for general patterns of process inclusion and exclusion from
the mind sets of some population, in this case modern humans. To do this, we look
for patterns of process inclusion and exclusion across the different mind sets of the
population in question. An interesting consequence of this model is that the question
‘What are the boundaries of the modern human mind?’, for example, is an empirical
question. The answer to this question comes only after observation of the scaffolding
densities of various processes in various people in a quantity great enough to make a
population-wide generalization.
With too little data to make a proper population-wide generalization among
modern humans, I make such a generalization anyway with the little, anecdotal data
available. We are looking for generalizations about what highly densely scaffolded
processes modern humans have. First, note what processes most modern humans
have in common. While some forms of technology may be relatively common, the
only real commonalities between the vast majority of modern humans are intracranial
processes. Moreover, while the technologies possessed by modern humans certainly
scaffold cognition, the scaffolding weight they contribute is far less than the average
density of intracranial cognitive processes. So, extracranial processes fail twofold
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to be cognitive for modern humans generally: they are neither common nor highly
scaffolded relative to the obviously highly densely scaffolded subgraph. If a single
modern day human were to have some process that contributes scaffolding weights
comparable to intracranial processes, then such a process would be part of his mind,
but this isolated case would not impact the generalization that, for modern humans
in general, cognition is limited to neuronal processes.
For further examples, let’s return to the neuroprosthetics that motivated this
work. Cochlear implants, deep brain stimulation, as well as the devices created by
Berger et al. and Andersen et al., appear to contribute scaffolding with weights not
significantly different neuronal processes, and thus should be considered to be parts
of the minds of the people who have them, according to ESM. Again, the number of
modern humans that have these devices is small, so such devices do not change the
claim that in general, modern human cognition is limited to neuronal processes.
4.1.2 Past Minds
Presumably, human cognition did not begin in its current form—the modern
human’s cognition is built upon successive expansions and developments in cognition.
That is, over evolutionary time the hominid mind has expanded, and we should have
an account of how this happened.
Sterelny is certainly interested in explaining this fact, and goes on to give
an explanation about how hominid memory may have evolved from simple detection
systems. He begins with simple detection systems, such as those present in bacteria
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and plants. These systems allow an organism to monitor their environments and
respond in very predictable ways (Sterelny, 2003, p. 14). Through these systems, an
organism monitors for a single environmental cue, then always responds in the same
predictable way. Because of this predictability, these systems are easily exploited. For
example, ants have simple detection systems that monitor for parasites and colony
invaders. Ants respond to specific chemical compounds to differentiate other ants of
the colony from invaders: so long as these chemical cues are present, the ants treat
an organism as part of the colony. This simple system is exploited by a number of
species of beetles that need only mimic these specific chemical cues to gain free roam
over the colony and exploit the colony’s resources (Sterelny, 2003, p. 15).
One evolutionary response to this exploitation of simple, single-cue detection
systems is to incorporate more cues and develop what Sterelny calls robust tracking
systems. That is, to keep parasites or predators from exploiting the tightly-bound
stimulus–response behavior of a single cue, an organism uses multiple cues to deter-
mine an action. Since more cues have to be met in order for a predator to elicit a
predictable response, the predator must put forth more effort to take advantage of
predictable behaviors. Also, having redundant cue systems allows organisms to com-
pensate in variable environments. For example, bees have at least three cue systems
by which they can navigate from hive to food source: landmarking, sun direction, and
sunlight polarization. By having these multiple cue systems, bees are able to com-
pensate for one system being unavailable due to variable environmental conditions,
such as a cloudy day or removal of landmarks (Sterelny, 2003, p. 24).
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The important difference between simple detection systems and robust track-
ing systems is response breadth. Simple detection systems have a narrow response
breadth, insofar as a single cue is tightly coupled with a predictable behavior. Ro-
bust tracking systems have a broad response breadth, since a single cue is not tightly
coupled with any specific behavior. According to Sterelny, the upper limit point of
response breadth are decoupled representations: robust tracking systems that have a
very broad response breath to the point that connections between cue and response
are very loose.
According to Sterelny, decoupled representation in hominids may have evolved
from the decoupling of spatial representations (Sterelny, 2003, p. 41). Many animals
have good spatial memory: the storage of information about their immediate environ-
ment. Some animals store this information as procedural maps, such as representing
the path from A to C with information about how to go from A to B and from B
to C. In this case, if B is removed or the organism is unable to detect it, the ani-
mal will not be able to travel from A to C. On the other hand, other animals have
a more decoupled representation of the information, whereby they store a cognitive
map of the environment between A and C and are able to choose any path between
the two (Sterelny, 2003, p. 41-42). The latter has the adaptive advantages of decou-
pled representation, and may have been one step on the way to hominid decoupled
representation.
The next step, for Sterelny, is from decoupled spatial maps to decoupled so-
cial maps, where these social maps are “a plausible origin of belief-like representa-
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tions” (Sterelny, 2003, p. 51-3). For hominids, social interactions exert evolutionary
pressure, and this requires robust social recognitional capacities and social memory
(Sterelny, 2003, p. 53). Either on the same systems as decoupled spatial represen-
tations or analogous ones, hominids developed decoupled social representations with
which to navigate the complex social environment. According to Sterelny, these de-
coupled social representations are also a plausible origin of belief-like representations.
This is expressed in his version of the Social Intelligence Hypothesis, which claims
that folk psychology and the concept of beliefs evolved as the adaptation to operating
in a society of organisms with behaviorally decoupled representations (Sterelny, 2003,
p. 56-7). That is, given the demands of society, one must also behave in certain ways
to avoid bad outcomes. Knowing how to behave well in society requires anticipat-
ing the behaviors of others. This is difficult because hominid society is composed of
individuals that already have decoupled representation in one way or another. This
makes individuals’ behaviors unpredictable, since behaviors are not tightly coupled
with given cues. An adaptation to overcome this difficulty is to develop a folk psychol-
ogy that uses decoupled, belief–like representations to perform the function of mind
reading. Attributing beliefs to individuals of society makes behavior prediction more
accurate, and more robust in cases where specific cues are missing. Thus, Sterelny
has an account of the evolution of modern human cognition from simple detection
systems.
It is not clear that SM has a good way of addressing this changing boundary.
At best, we could say that since Sterelny is vague and noncommittal about the details
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of the boundary (given his explanatory goals), his theory is not incompatible with a
changing boundary. While SM may be just vague enough to work, ESM can do better.
More than being merely consistent with a changing boundary, ESM has a robust ac-
count of how and when the boundary of hominid cognition changes over evolutionary
time. When environmental pressures selected for increasing decoupling of represen-
tations in systems like memory, this selection increased scaffolding weight. That is,
as something like a robust tracking system evolves, the processes that undergird it
gain scaffolding density. These processes may eventually rise in scaffolding density to
the point that they are comparable with already highly scaffolded processes, and thus
become part of the organism’s mind. So, over evolutionary time cognitive adapta-
tions go from having low scaffolding weight to being highly densely scaffolded. ESM
gives analogous accounts of the development of space and social maps, and eventually
gives the same account of the evolution of folk psychology. In this way, ESM gives a
detailed account of how cognitive boundaries expand with the widespread integration
of robust tracking systems. Other cognitive advancements can be accounted for in
an analogous way. So, ESM gives a robust account of how cognitive boundaries have
expanded over time.
4.1.3 Future Minds
Continuing the account ESM gives about how human cognition evolved in
the past to its present day boundaries, ESM can also give a robust account of how
human cognition may continue to expand in the future. As we have seen, some
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modern humans have cognitive boundaries extending beyond neurons, according to
ESM. To be able to say that for humans in general the boundary of cognition extends
into such devices, according to ESM it would require only that a sufficient proportion
of the human population had such devices in highly densely scaffolded ways to justify
the generalization. So, whereas SM does not offer a robust account of what it would
take for cognition to extend beyond the skull, ESM allows for cognition to extend
beyond the skull in the future and has a principled way of determining if and when
this happens.
4.1.4 Synchronic Group Diversity
So far I have discussed ESM at the level of the individual and the species
level. However, ESM can equally well apply to any grouping in between these levels.
A consequence of this is that ESM can account for synchronic group diversity in
cognitive boundaries. According to evolutionary theory, different groups of people
separated by barriers, whether they be geographical, cultural, or status-based, can
have divergent evolutions given enough time. One of these factors that may change
between different groups of people is the cognitive boundary. ESM allows us to
easily account for cognitive boundary differences between individuals posessing the
same kind of mind by making two generalizations. While we may be able to generalize
about hominids as a whole only to a limited extent, different subgroups can have more
extensive boundaries. For example, while cognition is limited at the skull for modern
humans, the boundary of cognition extends beyond this for the group of humans that
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have cochlear implants. So, ESM can not only make claims about individuals and
hominids as a whole, but can also make claims about subsets of humans, all while
using the same rigorous process.
4.2 Non-Human Minds
Since one of the virtues of ESM is that it meshes well with cognitive science,
and since cognitive science studies non-human entities in addition to human cognition,
it would do ESM well to be able to account for non-human cognition. ESM can indeed
account for non-human cognition: if an entity is accepted as being minded, whether
human or non-human, ESM sets down the boundary of that entity’s mind in the same
rigorous way. For other animals, this is fairly straightforward and I forgo a discussion
of these cases to pursue an account of more challenging kinds of minds. I show how
ESM can set a mind–environment boundary for radically non-human minded beings
using IBM’s Watson supercomputer as an example.
Watson, the computer to win Jeopardy! in 2011, is the product of IBM’s
DeepQA Research Team, which aims to create the first open-domain natural language
question-answering system (Ferrucci, 2012, p. 1). IBM brands Watson as a “cognitive
system” (IBM Research: Watson, n.d.). Suppose we take this literally and grant that
Watson is, in some relevant way, minded—that is, suppose we accept some philosophy
of mind that takes Watson to be a cognitive, minded being.1
1If one finds such a supposition to be impossible, then this example application of ESM holds
no weight. However, this does not tell against ESM, since one’s issue is with the philosophy of mind
rather than ESM, since ESM is not a tool for identifying minded beings but only setting cognitive
boundaries for organisms already supposed to be minded.
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We can then apply ESM to Watson and delineate Watson’s mind from its
environment, but we must first look at the process network as it pertains to Wat-
son. That is, we must first study Watson’s anatomy and delineate a highly densely
scaffolded subset of the process network. Watson is designed to be able to dynami-
cally interpret unstructured data, including natural human language. It relies on the
DeepQA architecture, which in many ways mirrors the functional work flow of humans
playing Jeopardy!. DeepQA begins by parsing, interpreting, and understanding the
input question. It begins by guessing what sort of answer the question requires and
parses the question grammatically (Lally et al., 2012; McCord et al., 2012). DeepQA
then accesses its stored memory to search for candidate answers. Importantly, Wat-
son is self-contained; it does not merely perform a Google search for information.
Like all Jeopardy! contestants, it has to learn, parse, and store information before
the contest. The research team loaded Watson with obvious sources of information,
like encyclopedias, reference books, and Wikipedia and a method of incorporating
other web resources (Chu-Carroll, Fan, Schlaefer, & Zardrozny, 2012). This unstruc-
tured information is then grammar-parsed and processed into structured information,
including a source-reliability index (Fan et al., 2012). Some of this processed infor-
mation takes the form of commonsense axioms, such as “books are found on shelves,”
“people visit museums,” and “candidates win elections” (Ferrucci, 2012). In this way,
Watson accumulates a corpus of self-contained knowledge, similar to the way in which
humans learn information from a source, process it, and store that processed infor-
mation in on-board hardware (i.e. memory neurons) for quick access later. DeepQA
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Fig. 4.1. DeepQA architecture. Reproduced from Ferrucci (2012, p. 5).
uses this stored information to generate candidate answers to the question, ranked
by confidence level (Chu-Carroll, Fan, Boguraev, et al., 2012). It then searches its
corpus of axioms, looking for evidence for or against each candidate and updates its
confidence levels (Murdock et al., 2012). This DeepQA architecture is then wrapped
in the Watson architecture, which adds Jeopardy! strategy, such as what confidence
threshold should be met before ringing in and how much to bet on Double Jeopardy
(Ferrucci, 2012). See fig. 4.1 for a full schematic of the DeepQA architecture. The
DeepQA Research Team sees applications for DeepQA beyond game shows, including
suggesting medical diagnoses (Ferrucci, 2012).
Since Watson is, putatively, minded, we can ask where the boundary between
Watson’s mind and its environment is. For instance, is the internet part of Watson’s
mind? ESM gives us a way of giving such a boundary. It says that we should expect
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there to be some highly densely scaffolded set of processes around where we would
expect Watson’s mind to be, and then we can determine whether or not a given
process is cognitive based on whether the scaffolding weight it offers is comparable to
the scaffolding density already within this obviously dense set.
With the anatomy of Watson’s architecture in mind, we can see that there
is indeed such an obviously densely scaffolded set, which includes its 90 networked
IBM Power 750 servers containing 2,800 POWER7 cores, 16 Terabytes of RAM,
and 4 Terabytes of disk space (Deedrick, 2011). These processes interact in highly
trusted, individualized, and entrenched ways. They are trusted because each process
relies on its input from other sectors without verifying the accuracy of the data.
One point where this may seem to not be true is in the “Hypothesis and Evidence
Scoring” part of the DeepQA architecture. This step takes proposed hypotheses
from the “Hypothesis Generation” module and checks them against a database of
information to assign probabilities of each hypothesis being true. This may initially
appear like mistrust of the hypothesis generator, since the scoring module does not
accept the hypotheses as already true, but this is a misunderstanding of the kind
of trust relevant for scaffolding. The kind of trust under consideration here focuses
on two components: the process giving the input is 1) functioning how it should,
and 2) is readily available. We can see that both of these conditions are met: the
scoring module trusts that the hypothesis generator is functioning as it should to
produce plausible hypotheses, and the generator is always available whenever the
scoring module needs its input. So, even in this case, these processes of Watson
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are highly trusted. This set of processes also has a high density of individualization.
Watson’s processors, RAM, and disk space are used solely by Watson. These processes
also have a high density of entrenchment. Each processor and piece of RAM and disk
space is filled with information and programming sequences, so that simply replacing
one of these components with a new one will result in system errors.
On the other hand, resources like its power supply, cooling mechanisms, and
even the internet are significantly less highly scaffolded. While necessary, individual
power supply lines and cooling mechanisms can be replaced without affecting Wat-
son’s functioning. More interesting, perhaps, is the internet. While Watson does
depend on the internet as a source of information to be stored in its database, the
internet is not highly scaffolded for Watson. While the information that goes into its
database has been preprocessed manually, Watson does not trust any single piece of
information gathered from the internet. When using this information, Watson always
verifies information it finds against other sources and preset axioms. So, the internet
does not rank very highly for Watson on the trust scaffolding dimension. Obviously,
the internet is not highly individualized for Watson—Watson is far from the only
organism to access and use information on the internet. Moreover, the internet is not
highly entrenched for Watson. While Watson requires information from the internet
at first, during its actual operation Watson is completely disconnected from the in-
ternet. So, the internet is not highly scaffolded for Watson. Thus, ESM claims, we
should set the boundary of Watson’s mind at its processors, RAM, and disk space
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Neuroprostheses make the question of where one’s mind ends and the environment
begins a pressing question for modern humans. We are at the precipice of living
in a time when these devices become widespread, and whether or not these devices
are truly cognitive will be an important philosophical, scientific, and political issue.
Ultimately, this work proposes ESM as an answer to this question.
ESM is a development of two previous answers to the question of how to set
down the mind–environment boundary, namely EM and SM. EM (defended by Clark
and others) proposed to treat any process that sufficiently complements intracranial
cognitive processes as cognitive processes themselves. SM (defended by Sterelny)
uses scaffolding to explain how extracranial process can be important for cognition
yet not cognitive processes themselves. Clark and Sterelny argue over which theory
has the superior explanatory power: Clark argues that EM is the only theory that can
adequately explain the importance of extracranial processes to cognition. Sterelny
argues that not only does SM account for the importance of extracranial processes,
but it can explain the entire spectrum of reliance on non-cognitive tools through
scaffolding.
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I agree with Sterelny that SM has more explanatory power than EM. However,
while SM fits Sterelny’s explanatory goals, it does not address the question of where
the mind–environment boundary actually lies.
My proposal, ESM, uses a modified version of Sterelny’s scaffolding to set down
the mind–environment boundary. Instead of looking at scaffolding as a relationship
between agents and scaffolds, ESM looks at scaffolding as a relationship holding be-
tween processes. On this process–process conception of scaffolding, we can model
processes using graph theory, where we let nodes represent processes and the connec-
tions between them represent the scaffolding relation. In keeping with the concept of
scaffolding, this resulting graph is directed, weighted, and transitive, with transitive
weights taking the minimum value of the steps in the transitive chain. Ultimately,
this model allows us to set down the mind–environment boundary in a principled
and rigorous way that also meshes with the explanatory aims of cognitive science in
general.
I have argued that the key factor in identifying the mind is scaffolding den-
sity. That is, we should identify the mind with the set of highly densely scaffolded
processes. Since the network of processes is continuous, there is no clean break to
be made between mind and environment. However, since ESM models scaffolding
using graph theory, we have at our disposal the rigorous analytics of graph theory to
make such a determination. How exactly such determinations are made may differ
according to one’s explanatory aims, but I offered a rough method by which to deter-
mine whether a process is densely scaffolded enough to be included in the mind of an
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organism. We can generally identify some core set of processes as obviously highly
densely scaffolded, and so obviously part of the mind. The question of whether or
not a process is part of the mind is more salient for processes outside of this set. For
such processes, this rough method says that we should include them in the mind of
an organism if the scaffolding that they contribute does not differ significantly from
the average density of the obviously dense core.
I then showed how ESM applies to several different classes of minded beings,
including past, present, and future humans as well as radically non-human minds such
as IBM’s Watson. Ultimately, ESM sets the mind–environment boundary for modern
humans at roughly the same place Sterelny does: the skull. However, ESM adds to SM
the ability to give a robust and principled account of where the boundary of cognition
should be set down. As a result, it can account for shifting cognitive boundaries as
well as non-human boundaries and varying boundaries between different members
of the same group. In addition, it meshes better with cognitive science both in
terms of explanatory scope and ability to integrate mathematical modeling based on
quantitative data.
Therefore, ESM presents a rigorous and principled way of setting down the
mind–environment boundary in such a way that maximizes explanatory power over
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